Essay: Against Integrative Bargaining by Korobkin, Russell
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 58 | Issue 4
2008
Essay: Against Integrative Bargaining
Russell Korobkin
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Russell Korobkin, Essay: Against Integrative Bargaining, 58 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1323 (2008)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol58/iss4/19
ESSAY
AGAINST INTEGRATIVE BARGAINING
Russell Korobkint
INTRODUCTION
Integrative bargaining, also known as "problem-solving," "value-
creating," or "win-win" negotiation, is the centerpiece of normative
negotiation scholarship and negotiation teaching. It has held this
position at least since the publication of "Getting to Yes" by Fisher
and Ury in 198 1,1 and perhaps since the publication of "A Behavioral
Theory of Labor Negotiations" by Walton and McKersie in 1965.2
To begin, let me admit that the title of this essay is somewhat
misleading, or at least lacks the subtlety that I hope to convey. I am
not really against integrative bargaining, by which I mean structuring
negotiated agreements in such a way as to increase the joint value of a
deal to the participating parties. As a matter of fact, I am firmly in
favor of it. Through integrative bargaining, negotiators can make
t Professor of Law, UCLA. This essay was presented as the Third Annual Center for
Interdisciplinary Study of Conflict and Dispute Resolution Distinguished Scholar-in-Residence
Lecture on October 3, 2007.
1 ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981). Fisher & Ury's "principled negotiation" framework does not
promote only integrative bargaining-its recommendation to focus on objective standards for
fair outcomes is more properly labeled a form of distributive bargaining. But I think it is fair to
say that it is principally known for its emphasis on searching for mutual gains, a quintessentially
integrative approach. See Roy L. Lewicki et al., Models of Conflict, Negotiation, and Third
Party Intervention, 13 J. ORG. BEH. 209, 226 (1992) (categorizing Fisher & Ury's principled
negotiation as a "normative integrative model[s]" of negotiation).
2 RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR
NEGOTIATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF A SOCIAL INTERACTION SYSTEM (1965).
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everyone involved in a transaction better off than they would
otherwise be.
But the value of integrative bargaining, although substantial, has
been oversold.3 This is true, I believe, with regard to negotiation
generally, and especially concerning legal negotiations, the term I use
for the negotiation contexts in which lawyers most routinely find
themselves. For the past quarter century, the primary normative
message of negotiation theory literature has been that negotiators will
achieve better outcomes by focusing their attention on the integrative
aspect of bargaining rather than its distributive aspect, by which I
mean the division of resources in a way that makes one party worse
off to the same extent that the other party is made better off.4 I call
this the "integrative bargaining supremacy" claim.
In some cases, the dedication to the value of integrative bargaining
often takes on a kind of missionary zeal. Practitioners of integrative
tactics are seen as modem, sophisticated negotiators. In their
search for "win-win" outcomes, they display subtlety, creativity,
intelligence, and sophistication. In contrast, negotiators who employ
distributive tactics are surly Neanderthals who try to use brute force
and other boorish, knuckle-dragging behavior to subjugate their
opponents. Teaching negotiation is viewed by many as the task of
civilizing the great unwashed horde of naive, instinctive negotiators
and convincing them to renounce their backward, distributive ways.
Integrative bargaining supremacy is often defended with the
assertion that, while most everyone has an intuitive sense of how to
3 Gerald Wetlaufer made this claim a decade ago in an important article. See Gerald
Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative Bargaining, 85 GEO. L.J. 369, 372 (1996). The arguments I
present here are different, but they can be understood as expanding on Wetlaufer's general
theme.
4 See David Fairman et al., The Negotiator's Fieldbook: The Virtues and Limits of a
Kaleidoscope, 23 NEG. J. 343, 351-52 (2007) (noting the implicit assumption in modem
negotiation theory that integrative bargaining is better than distributive bargaining "not because
it is ethically superior but because it works better along utilitarian lines"); LINDA BABCOCK &
SARA LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK 165 (claiming that two decades worth of research has
"shown that a cooperative approach, aimed and finding good outcomes for all parties rather than
just trying to 'win,' actually produces solutions that are objectively superior to those produced
by more competitive tactics"); ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING
TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 6 (advising lawyers on how they can "change the
game from adversarial bargaining to problem-solving .... "); Lewicki et al., supra note 1
("[T]he desirability of integrative agreements [has] been simply taken for granted by some
writers and widely acclaimed by others.").
5 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation in Popular Culture: What are We
Bargaining For?, in LAW AND POPULAR CULTURE 583, 585 (Michael Freemand ed., 2005)
("[P]opular depictions of adversarial and competitive negotiations dangerously perpetuate the
notion that legal negotiations are about 'winning' or besting the other side. These images limit
what consumers of popular culture can come to see as possible human and legal problem
solving must become more sophisticated, nuanced, creative and joint, not individual, gain-
seeking if we are to survive.").
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use some distributive tactics, such as taking a firm position and
grudgingly making concessions, individuals who lack formal
negotiation training are less likely to intuitively grasp the fundamental
concepts of integrative bargaining.6 This point is probably accurate,
but it can obscure the fact that negotiations generally, and legal
negotiations specifically, have more distributive potential than
integrative potential. For this reason, lawyer-negotiators would be
better served, on balance, to think of distributive bargaining as the
cake and integrative bargaining as the frosting, rather than the
reverse.
The first part of this essay distinguishes between integrative and
distributive value and provides a definition of integrative bargaining.
Part II explains how integrative potential is achieved by describing
four tactics that negotiators use to identify integrative value. With this
background established, Part III provides a method of comparing a
negotiation's relative potential for integrative and distributive value.
Part IV provides three important reasons that integrative potential is
often less than the conventional wisdom assumes. Part IV explains
why integrative bargaining will often have less potential, relative to
distributive bargaining, in typical settlement and transactional
negotiations in which lawyers routinely participate.
I. INTEGRATIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE VALUE
An agreement is integrative to the extent that it creates additional
cooperative surplus compared to some alternative. Because
integrative value is relative, identifying it requires the specification of
a baseline case for purposes of comparison.
6 See, e.g., Leigh Thompson, Information Exchange in Negotiation, 27 J. ExP. & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 161 (1991) (finding very few unprompted negotiators either provided or sought
information about preferences necessary to craft integrative agreements); Leigh Thompson &
Reid Hastie, Social Perception in Negotiation, 47 ORG. BEH. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES
98 (1990) (finding most negotiators suffer from the fixed-pie bias, which impedes integrative
bargaining). See generally BABCOCK & LASCHEVER, supra note 4, at 166 ("[V]ery few people
who have not been trained in negotiation realize the full benefits of an integrative approach.");
MAX H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 16-22 (1992)
(describing the "mythical fixed pie" that can impede integrative bargaining); DAVID A. LAX &
JAMES K. SEBENIUS, 3D NEGOTIATION 132 (2006) ("[Iln our experience, the world does not
suffer from . . . an overabundance of value creation in negotiation. We think that the more
common risk comes from an excessive focus on claiming 'my share' of the pie.").
7 Any agreement that makes both parties better off than they were before reaching a deal
can be said to create value. To the extent that any agreement that creates joint value is
sometimes referred to as "integrative," however, fails to distinguish between the value of using
integrative tactics and distributive tactics, and thus is unhelpful for the purposes of this essay.
Cf Wetlaufer, supra note 3, at 374 (observing that not all "value creation" involves integrative
bargaining).
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Suppose that Bonnie Buyer is negotiating to purchase a house
from Sam Seller. Bonnie's reservation price,8 defined as the
maximum that she would be willing to pay, is $100,000. Sam's
reservation price, defined as the minimum amount he would be
willing to accept, is $90,000. An agreement, if one is reached, will
create $10,000 in social value, or what I will call "cooperative
surplus," 9 relative to no deal, because Bonnie subjectively values the
house $10,000 more than does Sam. How that $10,000 is split
between them-whether, for example, the price agreed to is $90,000,
$95,000, or $100,000-is a matter of distributive bargaining; any gain
for Bonnie means a loss for Sam, and vice versa. We can thus say that
the deal will produce $10,000 in distributive value, divided based on
distributive bargaining ability.
Now let's also assume that Sam is an excellent handyman and
enjoys tinkering with things around the house. Bonnie, in contrast,
cannot fix anything, and she hates having to call service people to the
house because she fears that they will take advantage of her. These
facts suggest that more cooperative surplus might be created by the
sale of the house if Sam will promise to repair any item that breaks
for one year after the sale. Let us assume, for example, that this would
cause Bonnie's reservation price to increase to $110,000, while Sam's
reservation price would increase only to $92,000. Any deal that
included the repair agreement would be integrative because it would
create more cooperative surplus than the parties could obtain through
the sale of the house alone-the baseline case. The extra $8,000 can
be understood as the value that can be generated by the negotiators'
integrative bargaining ability.
This example demonstrates what an integrative agreement might
look like, but it does not provide an analytically precise description of
what the baseline point of comparison should be for a judgment
whether an agreement is integrative. Let me suggest the following
definition: for an agreement to be appropriately labeled integrative, it
must create more cooperative surplus than the terms of whatever type
of agreement would be customary under the circumstances. If houses
were customarily sold with a one-year repair agreement, agreeing to a
sale with such a repair agreement would still create $18,000 in
cooperative surplus-which would have to be divided between the
parties-but it would not be an example of an integrative agreement.
This definition underscores that integrative bargaining requires
8 See, e.g., HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 37 (1982); LEIGH
THOMPSON, THE MIND AND HEART OF THE NEGOTIATOR 17 (1998).
9 See, e.g., RUSSELL KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND STRATEGY 42 (2002).
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creativity on the part of the negotiators-the ability to think "outside
the box" rather than simply agree to customary terms.
II. ACHIEVING INTEGRATIVE BARGAINS
With this definition in place, it becomes possible to describe a set
of tactics, or techniques, that negotiators can employ to reach
integrative agreements: adding issues, subtracting issues, substituting
issues, and logrolling.' ° All four are variations on the theme of
searching for ways to reconfigure the terms of a deal to increase its
joint value.
A. Adding Issues
The simplest way to make an agreement integrative is to add one
or more issues that the buyer values more than the seller to the
customary set of terms, or what I will call the "negotiation package."
The seller of a used car might add a warranty, the seller of a company
might add his services during a transitional period of time, or a
plaintiff in litigation might add a non-disclosure clause, promising to
keep the generous settlement price secret to protect the defendant
from subsequent nuisance suits. Of course, adding issues to the
negotiation package is only integrative if the buyer values them more
than the seller. Adding issues that the seller values more than the
buyer would reduce the cooperative surplus. Assuming that Sam
loves the antique chair that sits in the living room, whereas Bonnie
considers it the ultimate example of poor taste, adding it to the
transaction would reduce the cooperative surplus rather than increase
it: Sam's reservation price would increase (because he values the
chair), while Bonnie's would stay the same (because she does not) or
maybe even increase slightly (because she would have to dispose of
it).
B. Subtracting Issues
The opposite of adding an issue that the buyer values more than
the seller is subtracting something from the negotiation package that
the seller values more than the buyer. Opportunities to profit from this
integrative tactic are often more difficult to spot than opportunities to
add issues because the negotiators first have to identify ways to
unbundle what often appears to be a unitary, indivisible item. If the
negotiation package consists of a single house, as in the example I
10 For greater description of integrative tactics, see id. at 129-34.
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used involving Sam and Bonnie, what is there to subtract? As it turns
out, ownership of a house can be sliced and diced in many different
ways, as can the contents of almost any negotiation package. Two
examples: First, ownership can be divided into physical parts: if Sam
loves the original chandelier in the dining room and Bonnie is
indifferent, the chandelier can be subtracted from the package.
Second, ownership can be divided temporally: if Sam wants to keep
the house until his relatives visit in the spring and Bonnie is in no
hurry to move, cooperative surplus can be created by subtracting
ownership for the next six months from the negotiation package.
C. Substituting Issues
Sometimes, parties can determine in the course of negotiations that
the cooperative surplus they could create by entering an agreement
would be greater if they completely changed the subject of the
negotiation from what they originally assumed it would be. Perhaps
when Bonnie visits Sam's house, she learns that he has another,
similar property nearby. The main difference is that the second house
is located on a main street and has associated traffic noise, so Sam
would be willing to sell it for $85,000. The location makes it far more
convenient to public transportation, however, which Bonnie values
highly because she doesn't own a car, so she is willing to pay up to
$110,000 for it. In this case, substituting the noisy, convenient house
for the quiet, inconvenient house-which could be understood
alternatively as subtracting one issue and adding another-should be
considered an integrative move.
D. Logrolling
Finally, in many bargaining contexts, the baseline, or customary
deal includes multiple issues, but the terms that deal with those issues
can be changed. In this case, it provides conceptual clarity to think in
terms of logrolling-that is, trading one issue for another-rather
than adding or subtracting issues. For example, either Bonnie's or
Sam's real estate agent might produce a copy of a standard form
contract drafted by the local association of realtors that specifies that
the sale will close in thirty days and provides the buyer with ten days
in which to conduct a home inspection and cancel the transaction if
defects are discovered. If Bonnie is leaving on vacation and wants to
conduct the inspection when she returns, and Sam wants at least two
months before he has to move, the parties can logroll by agreeing to
extend the inspection contingency to twenty days and the number of
days until closing to sixty.
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III. COMPARING THE VALUE OF INTEGRATIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE
TACTICS
Having clarified basic definitions and described a series of
integrative bargaining tactics, let me turn to the subject of how we
might think about comparing a negotiation's integrative potential with
its distributive potential. The governing assumption here is that most
negotiators would wish to choose whether to emphasize integrative or
distributive bargaining tactics based on which type offers the greatest
potential for creating cooperative surplus for their clients. That is, the
goal is maximizing a negotiator's private value, not social value.
Given this assumption, I will now consider the general contextual
features that bear on whether distributive and/or integrative tactics
will have substantial potential value in any given negotiation.
A. The Source of Distributive Potential: Bilateral Monopoly
The relative opportunity for distributive gains depends on the
degree of competition in the market for the goods and services that
make up the negotiation package. When negotiating a deal under
conditions that approach those of perfect competition (many buyers,
many sellers, commodity products, and low transaction costs) the
opportunity for distributive gains will be small. In situations of true
perfect competition, there will be no opportunity for distributive gains
at all, because both buyers and sellers will be price takers and
agreement possible only at single price point, with both parties being
nearly indifferent to pursuing a different transaction. One dollar more
and the buyer will not buy; one dollar less and the seller will not sell.
In contrast, under conditions of bilateral monopoly (one buyer, one
seller, and a unique product with no good substitutes) there typically
will be a much larger variance between the reservation prices of the
buyer and the seller. 1 When the seller's reservation price exceeds the
buyer's, there will be no opportunity for a mutually beneficial deal.
But when the buyer's reservation price exceeds the seller's, the
potential benefits to be gained from distributive bargaining often will
be large.
For the sake of comparison, imagine two people who hope to
negotiate the purchase of a car. Carl is in the market for a commodity
product, a new Toyota Camry. He plans to visit his local Toyota
dealership, Archie's Autos, this Saturday in hopes of negotiating a
purchase. There are many buyers in the market for new Camrys; it has
I1 See generally Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J.
1789, 1826-27 (2000).
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been the best selling car in the United States for nine out of the past
ten years. And there are many sellers of Camrys, at least in urban
areas. In this circumstance, the bargaining zone is likely to be small.
No matter how much Carl is dying to purchase a new Camry, his
reservation price when he walks into the dealership will be limited by
the price at which he can buy the model at another dealership in the
area. If Carl knows from researching newspaper advertisements that
another dealer ten miles away is offering the car for $20,000, Carl's
reservation price is going to be very close to that amount. For sake of
discussion, let us assume Carl's reservation price is actually $20,100
because, once he is in Archie's showroom, it is worth $100 to him not
to have to drive to and bargain with the dealer down the road.
Given the assumption that there is a competitive market amongst
dealerships, if the competing dealer is offering the cars for $20,000, it
is unlikely that Archie can sell the cars for much less than that amount
and still turn a profit. In the real world, all sellers are usually not
completely identical in every respect, which is to say conditions are
likely to fall short of perfect competition. Let us assume Archie has
limited space on his lot, so he is willing to sell for a bit less than his
competitor in order to free up space to display a new model, and as a
result his reservation price is $19,800, meaning that an agreement
between Carl and Archie will generate $300 of cooperative surplus.
Now consider Carl's friend Ulysses, who prefers more unique
automobiles. Ulysses is hoping to purchase a 1930 Studebaker
Commander Victoria in near mint condition, with the original paint
and original interior. After searching for a number of years, he has
located one in the possession of Catherine Collector. Catherine
occasionally receives inquiries concerning some of her other cars, like
her 1957 Mustang, but she rarely comes into contact with anyone
interested in purchasing a vintage Studebaker.
Under these circumstances, there is no liquid market of buyers and
sellers to enforce a narrow bargaining range. Since neither Ulysses
nor Catherine has a good substitute transaction, this negotiation can
be classified as a bilateral monopoly situation. In this case, the
parties' reservation prices might be close together, by chance, but
they also could be widely divergent. For example, it is plausible that
Ulysses' reservation price is $80,000 and Catherine's is $20,000, in
which case there would be a $60,000 cooperative surplus to be
divided in case of an agreement. In this circumstance, the
negotiation's distributive potential would be quite large. Skill at
distributive bargaining could be worth tens of thousands of dollars to
Ulysses or Catherine, whereas distributive bargaining skill is unlikely
1330 [Vol. 58:4
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to be worth more than a couple hundred dollars, at most, to Archie or
Carl.
B. The Source of Integrative Potential: Incremental Improvements
While a negotiation's distributive potential depends on the
expected variance between the parties' reservation prices, its
integrative potential depends on the expected increase in the amount
of cooperative surplus that can be created by creatively restructuring
or redefining the negotiation package relative to the baseline package.
Integrative potential is likely to be substantial when two conditions
are present; less so when either condition is absent. First, there must
be a substantial difference in the value of the baseline negotiation
package and a reconfigured negotiation package. Second, there must
be heterogeneity across parties in the value they place on the
reconfigured negotiation package. If the first condition holds but not
the second, integrative bargaining might raise (or lower) the buyer's
reservation price but simultaneously raise (or lower) the seller's
reservation price, substantially changing the nature of the deal but not
increasing the cooperative surplus. If the second condition holds but
not the first, integrative tactics are likely to create value, but only
small amounts that are of little significance to the parties.
To illustrate these points, let us return to the examples of our
automobile negotiators. First, consider a situation in which condition
one holds but condition two does not. Let us assume that vintage car
collectors universally place a very high value on the condition of a
car's interior. Consistent with this, Ulysses is willing to pay $80,000
for a 1930 Studebaker that has been competently maintained, but he is
willing to pay $100,000 if the car is expertly refurbished to look like
it did in its original condition. Catherine could have the car
refurbished to its original condition, but doing so would make the car
far more attractive to her as well. In untouched, used condition,
Catherine would be willing to sell the car for $20,000. If she
refurbished it to original condition, however, Catherine would not be
willing to sell it for less than $40,000. In this case, adding the issue of
"refurbishment" to the negotiation package would change the nature
of the transaction substantially, but it would not add to the
cooperative surplus. Integrative bargaining ability would have little if
any potential to create value for the negotiators here.
If there is high variance in preferences for "refurbishment"
amongst vintage car enthusiasts, or in costs of refurbishing, the
analysis changes substantially. Assume, for simplicity, that half of
vintage car collectors care tremendously about refurbishment and the
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other half do not care at all-the latter appreciate the patina of time
and wear. In this case, adding the issue of refurbishment to the
negotiation package might create a very large amount of cooperative
surplus. If it turns out that Ulysses is of the type that values
refurbishment highly, and Catherine is of the type that does not,
adding the issue could increase the potential cooperative surplus of a
deal by tens of thousands of dollars. Under these assumptions,
integrative bargaining tactics would have significant potential to
create value in the negotiation, although they would not yield value in
every single case.
Now let us consider a negotiating circumstance in which condition
two is present, but not condition one. Assume that Toyota Camry
purchasers have heterogeneous preferences for the presence of floor
mats in their cars. Half find them to be a useful accessory and value
them at $50; half think they are useless and value them at $0. All
dealers place a very low value on floor mats, because Toyota
manufactures them cheaply in bulk and provides them to its dealers
for $25 a set. In this situation, there is a 50 percent chance that adding
a set of floor mats to the new Camry would create cooperative surplus
for Carl and Archie, meaning that the negotiation might have
integrative value. The problem is that the integrative potential is small
in absolute terms, in the context of a $20,000 purchase; not irrelevant,
but obviously far less important that the price of the car.
To summarize: a negotiation will have relatively more distributive
potential if its context approaches bilateral monopoly than if its
context approaches perfect competition, and it will have relatively
more integrative potential if the possible changes to the baseline
transaction significantly affect the overall value of the transaction,
and the variance in negotiators' valuations of those changes is high.
This analysis provides a construct for comparing the integrative
and distributive potential of a given negotiation, but it certainly does
not demonstrate that the integrative bargaining supremacy claim is
misguided, on average. Part IV argues that integrative potential is
often more limited in negotiations than it might initially appear to be.
Part V claims that we should expect the majority of legal negotiations
to have relatively high distributive potential and relatively low
integrative potential.
IV. THREE STRIKES AGAINST INTEGRATIVE BARGAINING
SUPREMACY
Even in conditions that appear to have integrative potential, there
are three reasons that the value of integrative tactics might be less
1332 [Vol. 58:4
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than meets the eye. None of these points undermines the theoretical
value of integrative bargaining, but all suggest that integrative tactics
might be less valuable, compared to distributive tactics, than
integrative bargaining supremacists commonly assume.
A. The Possibility of Transactions with Third Parties
When issues are added to the baseline negotiation package, those
issues are often separable from the content of the customary package.
For example, rather than adding the floor mats to the sale of the
Toyota Canary, one can imagine Carl and Archie entering into a
contract for the sale of the Camry and then, a month later, Carl
returning to the dealership and negotiating for the mats. Let us
assume again that Carl's reservation price for the car is $20,100 and
Archie's is $19,800, and that Carl's reservation price for the mats is
$50 and Archie's is $25. Assuming separate negotiations, we would
characterize each as purely distributive.
For this reason, Professor Wetlaufer has argued that adding the
issue of floor mats to the negotiation concerning the Canry is not an
example of integrative bargaining at all. 12 I disagree with this
analysis. If Camrys are customarily sold without floor mats, adding
the issue of the mats does increase the amount of cooperative surplus
available: Carl's reservation price for the package of Camry plus mats
will be $20,150, and Archie's reservation price for the package will
be $19,825, increasing the cooperative surplus from $300 to $325. It
is true that combining the issues does not produce any more
cooperative surplus than the parties could have created by negotiating
twice-once for the car and once for the floor mats, but the double
negotiation scenario is probably not the appropriate baseline case for
comparison. If the parties don't add the mats to the Camry transaction
today, it is unlikely that Carl will return next month to negotiate for
them separately. If my intuition about this is correct, the proper
baseline transaction is cash-for-car, not cash-for-car plus cash-for-
mats.
The problem for integrative bargaining supremacists is that, in
many examples often used to demonstrate integrative potential, it
would be more efficient for one or both negotiators to enter into the
second part of the transaction with a third party than with their
immediate negotiation counterpart. When this is the case, the use of
integrative tactics such as adding issues will increase the cooperative
surplus available to the parties in the particular negotiation but
12 Wetlaufer, supra note 3, at 377-78.
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produce less overall value than could have been achieved through an
alternative course of action. It might be the case that Toyota can
produce floor mats that fit Camrys particularly cheaply, or that Carl
places a high subjective value on floor mats with the Toyota insignia.
In either case, adding the floor mats to the negotiation would create
value. But if a third party vendor can produce an equivalent product
more cheaply, and if Carl does not care about the logo, more
cooperative surplus would be created if Carl were to purchase his
floor mats elsewhere.
To generalize, bundling issues can often obscure the fact that
integrative tactics can make the parties better off than they would
have been had they just made the baseline exchange, but leave them
worse off than they could have been had they dealt with third parties
with regard to the additional issues. This risk demonstrates an
important limitation on the potential of integrative tactics to create
value for negotiators.
B. Incorporation of Integrative Potential into Baseline Transactions
When negotiation theorists conceptualize integrative bargaining,
they often begin, as I have done in this essay, by imagining very
simple baseline transactions and then imagining how adding
complexity to them could increase the available cooperative surplus.
So, for example, the baseline transaction between Carl and Archie is
conceptualized as "car-for-cash," and adding the issue of floor mats is
described as a potential way to use an integrative tactic to increase
cooperative surplus. Or, alternatively, substituting a "lease" for a
"purchase" is described as a potential way to subtract ownership in
later years from the baseline transaction in order to increase potential
cooperative surplus.
Although their simplicity makes these minimalist conceptions of
baselines useful for illustrating abstract theoretical points, such simple
examples can obscure the fact that trade custom often builds complex
and sophisticated terms into the baseline version of transactions. In
these situations, skill at employing the tactics of integrative
bargaining is not necessary for negotiators to take advantages of
potential efficiencies. If most car buyers value floor mats more than it
costs sellers to provide them, the standard baseline transaction offered
by auto dealers is likely to include the floor mats; customer and
salesman will not have to identify the opportunity to create value by
bundling floor mats with cars, because the manufacturers will offer
the mats as part of the "car" package. If leases provide more joint
1334 [Vol. 58:4
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value for many dealer-customer pairs than do sales, many car dealers
will offer customers the choice of a pre-designed lease transaction.
This analysis, of course, does not suggest that integrative tactics
can never help the parties create cooperative surplus because all deals
are optimally efficient. Trade custom only evolves after early movers
innovate. Someone has to identify that cooperate surplus is
maximized by bundling floor mats with cars and offering leases in
addition to sales before these terms can become part of the baseline
transaction, which means that the unusual transactions can provide
substantial opportunities for integrative tactics even when
commonplace transactions might not. And even after the development
through custom of baseline transactions that maximize the
cooperative surplus in common transactions, some (and perhaps
many) parties will have unusual or idiosyncratic preferences or cost
structures, which will make integrative tactics profitable in their
specific deals. If most car buyers value floor mats but Carl does not,
cooperative surplus can be created in his negotiation with Archie by
subtracting the floor mats from the negotiation, assuming that trade
custom has caused them to be included in the baseline transaction.
But the amount of value that can be gained only if the lawyers
negotiating the deal's terms are personally skilled at using integrative
bargaining tactics is often much less than what is assumed in the
typical negotiation classroom, where the acquired wisdom of
industry-specific custom that informs the baseline for transactions in
the real world is rarely assumed.
C. Integrative Tactics Create Distributive Potential
Another reason that negotiators should be skeptical about the
relative potential of integrative tactics, as compared to distributive
tactics, is an important asymmetry between the two: skillful use of
integrative tactics increases the opportunity a negotiator has to benefit
from distributive tactics, but the reverse is not true.
Let us create a set of facts that make integrative tactics appear to
have far more profit potential than distributive tactics. Assume that
Ulysses has a reservation price of $40,000 for the 1930 Studebaker,
and Catherine has a reservation price of $39,000. Ulysses would
value the car, refurbished, at $60,000, and Catherine, who considers
refurbishing vintage cars a relaxing hobby, is willing to do the
refurbishing for $2,000. Assume that no one can refurbish a
Studebaker as well as Catherine, and because she considers doing so
fun rather than work, no one can do it for cheaper, so adding the issue
of refurbishment to the baseline transaction is not masking a more
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efficient possible transaction with a third party for either negotiator.
In this example, the distributive potential of the negotiation seems
small-specifically, the $1000 of cooperative surplus in the baseline
condition-but its integrative potential is $18,000.
This analysis is correct as far as it goes, but it does not go far
enough. By employing the integrative tactic of adding an issue, the
parties have created $18,000 of cooperative surplus, but that surplus
must be divided. The parties can capture the deal's integrative
potential only if they now agree on a sales price between $41,000 and
$60,000, and that price will be determined based on the negotiators'
skill in using distributive tactics. In other words, because this deal has
$18,000 of integrative potential, it has $19,000 of distributive
potential (not just $1,000). More generally, the more integrative
potential of a negotiation, the more potential value of distributive
bargaining.
This principle holds true even when the negotiation is not over
price. Consider a divorcing couple who own a townhouse in the city
and a cottage in the country, each with approximately the same
market value. Their lawyers advise them that a standard divorce
agreement calls for the sale of non-liquid assets and an equal division
of the proceeds and, in fact, if they do not agree to a division of their
property, a court will order exactly this. Husband Harold hates the
congestion of the city and loves the clean air of country. Wife Wendy
loves the energy of urban life and despises the isolation of rural life.
Clearly, cooperative surplus can be created if Wendy keeps the
townhouse and Harold the cottage, because both would enjoy far
more than half of the subjective value produced by their joint assets.
Make no mistake, however: the integrative potential of this
negotiation makes distributive skills more, not less, important as long
as side payments are possible, which they virtually always are.
Precisely because she values the townhouse much higher than the
cottage, Wendy would prefer to keep the townhouse and pay Harold
significant cash compensation rather than going to court. Because
Harold values the cottage so highly, he would prefer to keep it and
pay Wendy significant cash compensation rather than go to court.
Which spouse pays the other (in cash or other marital assets) as part
of the deal? The answer will depend on the exercise of distributive
tactics.
A common intuition is that the most likely outcome in such a
negotiation would be that each spouse agrees simply to keep his or
her preferred house and neither makes a side payment. I agree with
this empirical conjecture, but the reason such an outcome is likely is
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because one or both parties might argue that payments are
inappropriate because each spouse obtains an equal amount of
objective value by simply keeping his or her preferred residence,
because an agreement to make no side payments is a salient focal
point amongst an infinite number of possible arrangements, or
because it is customary not to exchange cash in this type of
situation. 13 Employing any of these arguments to reach an agreement
constitutes distributive bargaining.
V. INTEGRATIVE VS. DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING IN LEGAL
NEGOTIATIONS
From the standpoint of negotiation theory, there is no such
category as "legal" negotiation. There are, however, some negotiation
contexts in which the participation of lawyers is ubiquitous. Certain
characteristics of these contexts suggest that lawyer-negotiators, in
particular, will have more to gain for their clients through their skill in
distributive tactics than through their skill at integrative bargaining.
A. Litigation Settlement
Perhaps the prototypical bargaining context involving lawyers is
the out-of-court settlement negotiation, in which the negotiators seek
to exchange the waiver of the legal claims of the plaintiff (effectively
the "seller") for some consideration, usually money, offered by the
defendant (effectively the "buyer"). Since the large majority of all
lawsuits are resolved through negotiation rather than adjudication, 14
settlement negotiations might be called the primary business of
litigators. "
With a few very narrow exceptions, settlement negotiations reflect
nearly perfect bilateral monopoly conditions, which suggests that
distributive potential is likely to be substantial. If Walker files a
lawsuit against Driver for negligent operation of her automobile,
neither has the option of settling the claim with a third party instead
of the other litigant, in the way that Carl can purchase his Camy from
13 See generally KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY, supra note 9, at 182-220 ("Fair
Division and Related Social Norms").
14 See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, Most Cases Settle: Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339, 1339 (1994).
15 This observation causes some scholars to refer to the term "ADR," usually shorthand
for "alternative dispute resolution," as "appropriate dispute resolution." See, e.g., Christopher
Honeyman & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Introduction: A 'Canon' of Negotiation Begins to
Emerge, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK 1, 4 (Christopher Honeyman & Andrea Kupfer
Schneider eds., 2006).
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dozens of Toyota dealers (or a similar car from many other
automakers) if he thinks Archie is trying to drive too hard a bargain.
The distributive potential is reinforced by the fact that the
transaction costs of pursuing adjudication are high, and the outcome
of adjudication is always uncertain. Assuming that litigants are risk
averse, both factors suggest that not only are the plaintiff and
defendant likely to have divergent reservation prices in settlement
negotiations, in most cases the defendant's reservation price should
be higher than the plaintiff's. In such circumstances, the cooperative
surplus that can be produced by the baseline agreement-the
exchange of cash for a waiver of claims-will often be large.
While the distributive potential of settlement negotiations is, on
average, large, their integrative potential will usually be small. Where
the litigants have an ongoing relationship, it is conceivable that they
could add issues concerning that relationship to the negotiation
package and create substantial value-for example, a defendant could
promise to place future orders with the plaintiff in return for the
plaintiff dropping his breach of contract suit-but this can increase
joint value relative to the baseline transaction only if the dispute has
not sufficiently poisoned the relationship to the point that continued
dealings aren't feasible (that is, the benefits of an ongoing
relationship must outweigh the costs), and the parties would not have
independently entered the same agreements concerning the future
(because if they would have negotiated the same future arrangements
regardless, the integrative bargaining tactics would not create any
marginal value). And this possibility of integrative value, of course,
does not exist at all when the lawsuit is between strangers or
near-strangers.
A common example of an integrative tactic that can be used in a
settlement negotiation between strangers is the addition to the
negotiation package of an apology by the defendant. Adding an
apology often will be more valuable to the recipient plaintiff than
costly to an issuing defendant, so it has the possibility of creating
cooperative surplus. 16 But except in cases where reputational damage
has caused long term harm to a plaintiffs financial interests,
apologies usually have a small amount of value in comparison to the
issue of damages.
16 For some evidence on how a defendant's apology might reduce a plaintiff's reservation
price in settlement negotiations, see Jennifer K. Robbenolt, Apologies & Legal Settlement: An
Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REv. 460, 484-91 (2003); Russell Korobkin & Chris
Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH.
L. REv. 107, 147-50 (1994).
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Consider a wrongful death plaintiff willing to accept $1 million to
settle his claim out of court, and a defendant with a reservation price
of $1.5 million. If the defendant offers to add a formal apology to a
settlement, the plaintiffs reservation price is likely to decline only
slightly. A gratuitous apology-that is, one provided without the
explicit condition that it be considered part of the compensation
package-offered by the defendant at the outset of negotiations is
likely to be a very good distributive tactic, because it is likely to
engender goodwill and cause the plaintiff to be less recalcitrant when
the parties bargain over the $500,000 in cooperative surplus. 17 But the
apology probably has only modest potential to expand the bargaining
zone and increase the total cooperative surplus.
Structuring settlement payments over a period of time (effectively
adding the issue of a financing arrangement to the baseline
transaction) can create joint value by taking advantage of differences
in discount rates and/or tax status, 18 but this also will usually expand
the bargaining zone only modestly compared to the amount of
cooperative surplus at stake in a baseline transaction that assumes an
immediate cash payment.
B. Business Transactions
Perhaps settlement negotiations have more distributive than
integrative potential, on average, but what about the transactional
negotiations conducted by business lawyers that grease the wheels of
commerce? Most business negotiations are not defined by bilateral
monopoly conditions, and many offer the possibility of significantly
changing the overall nature of the transaction by adding or subtracting
issues. For these reasons, it is clear that the relative potential of
integrative bargaining tactics is far greater, on average, in
transactional negotiations than in distributive ones. But the relative
potential of integrative bargaining can easily be overstated even in
this context.
One reason is that in many transactional negotiations, the clients
agree on the foundational structure of the negotiation package,
including price, before the lawyers become involved. At this point,
the business executives call on their legal department or their outside
17 See Russell Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory and
Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. DISP. REs. 306-07 (2006) (apologies useful in breaking cycle of
increasing anger); David F. Sally & Gregory Todd Jones, Game Theory Behaves, in THE
NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK 87, 92 (Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Chris Honeyman eds., 2007)
(apologies useful in reducing social distance).
18 See, e.g., LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 6, at 144-46 (explaining how structured
settlements can create joint value).
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attorneys to "paper the deal" with a formal contract, and it is only at
this point that the lawyers become involved in the negotiation.
Under these conditions, the negotiation context looks more like a
bilateral monopoly, and the value of distributive skill increases.
Although both parties technically retain the option to walk away from
the negotiation and enter into an agreement with a different party, the
transactional and reputational costs of doing so at this point can be
substantial. In addition, the lawyer, as an agent, faces high personal
costs of recommending this course of action to her client, because she
risks being labeled as a deal-killer. In this situation, there will tend to
be a large bargaining zone, which is to say that both the buyer's and
seller's lawyers will prefer to sacrifice a substantial amount of the
cooperative surplus that a completed transaction will create rather
than break off negotiations and recommend cancellation of the deal to
their clients. This feature, common in business transactions at the
time the lawyers enter into the picture, suggests that distributive
tactics will often be quite valuable.
While the distributive potential of transaction negotiations is often
greater than it initially appears, the integrative potential of
transactional negotiations is often relatively less than it first appears
because the widespread adoption of efficiencies into the baseline
negotiation package through the development of trade custom. This
is true for large-scale business transactions generally, and for
industry-specific negotiations in which transactional lawyers develop
specializations.
Take, for example, a merger negotiation, in which a large
conglomerate, Alpha Company, seeks to purchase a small, high-
technology company called Beta. Beta's value to Alpha is primarily
in the former's portfolio of technology patents. Because Beta has
more information than Alpha about whether competitors might seek
to challenge the validity of these patents on the grounds that they are
not sufficiently novel or non-obvious, Alpha's reservation price is
likely to increase more than Beta's will if Beta provides a contractual
representation that it has no knowledge of any current challenges to
its patents and agrees to indemnify Alpha for harms suffered if such a
challenge is subsequently mounted by a third party.
On its face, this looks like an excellent example of integrative
potential, and indeed it would be if we were to assume that the
baseline transaction between Alpha and Beta would include no such
representation or indemnification provision. This probably was a fair
description of the situation the first time one company purchased
another principally for the latter's patent portfolio and consulted a
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lawyer for assistance in structuring the terms of the deal. In most
cases, however, lawyers do not begin negotiating the terms of
complicated transactions from scratch. Instead, they draw on a large
base of institutional memory and industry custom. Where this is the
case, the value of providing these terms is captured by customary
practice, and the integrative potential that depends on the skill of the
negotiators will be correspondingly limited.
Complex transactions in which terms are negotiated to some
degree-as opposed to deals in which one party offers an adhesion
contract to the other on a take-it-or-leave-it basis-will always offer
some potential for integrative bargaining, because the preferences,
needs, and cost structures of the parties are unlikely to be precisely
the same from one transaction to the next. But the amount of value
that can be gained only if the lawyers negotiating the deal's terms are
personally skilled at using integrative bargaining tactics is often much
less than what is assumed in the typical negotiation classroom, where
the acquired wisdom of industry-specific custom that informs the
baseline for transactions in the real world is rarely assumed.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the provocative title of this essay, my criticism is
of the integrative bargaining supremacy claim, not integrative
bargaining itself. The point is one of emphasis. My argument is not
that integrative bargaining has no value or even minimal value, but
more modestly, that the majority of legal negotiations will have more
distributive than integrative potential. I have tried to support this
claim, admittedly circumstantially, by showing that the types of
negotiations in which lawyers typically participate will usually have
substantial distributive potential, and at the same time that their
integrative potential will tend to be more limited than often assumed.
What has been most obviously lacking, perhaps, is a description of
the tactics negotiators might use to take advantage of the distributive
potential that I claim is ubiquitous. Distributive bargaining is itself a
complex activity that deserves its own nuanced analysis. Proponents
of integrative bargaining supremacy sometimes caricature distributive
tactics as being limited to making unreasonable demands and then
refusing to make concessions. Although aggressiveness and
stubbornness do have their place as tactics, distributive bargaining is
not limited to these stereotypic behaviors. A savvy bargainer who
focuses attention on distribution devotes resources to improving her
options away from the bargaining table, understands the needs of her
counterpart, invokes external norms as the basis for decisions, uses
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social norms of fair bargaining to reach agreement, and builds a
reputation as a fair and honorable business partner.19 Unfortunately, a
discussion of how a negotiator can best combine these approaches to
achieve success at capturing cooperative surplus from her
counterpart-that is, at distributive bargaining-is a topic for another
essay.
19 See generally KOROBKIN, NEGOTIATION THEORY, supra note 9, chs. 5-6.
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